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Abstract 
 
In the debate on the impact of illicit capital flows on developing countries, the view is 
widespread that profit shifting to low tax jurisdictions undermines the ability of 
developing countries to raise tax revenue. While the shifting of income out of 
developed countries is a widely debated issue, empirical evidence on the magnitude of 
the problem and on the factors driving income shifting is scarce. This paper reviews 
the literature on tax avoidance and evasion through border crossing income shifting 
out of developing countries. Moreover, we discuss methods and available datasets 
which can be used to gain new insights into the problem of corporate income shifting. 
We argue that results of many existing studies on tax avoidance and evasion in 
developing countries are difficult to interpret, mainly because the measurement 
concepts used have a number of drawbacks. We discuss some alternative methods and 
datasets and present some empirical evidence which supports the view that profit 
shifting out of many developing countries and into tax havens takes place. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the debate on the impact of illicit capital flows on developing countries, the view is widespread that 
illicit flows undermine the ability of developing countries to raise tax revenue. The reason is that illicit 
capital flows may channel resources to the informal economy or to other jurisdictions, in particular to 
tax havens, so that they escape taxation. A large part of this activity takes place in the shadow 
economy and largely escapes public attention. But parts of the ‘official economy’, in particular 
multinational firms, are accused to engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion as well. They are 
criticised for shifting income out of developing countries and into tax havens in order to avoid paying 
corporate income taxes. Since developing countries frequently lack appropriate legislative and 
administrative resources, they are generally seen to be more vulnerable to income shifting than 
developed countries. 
 
While the shifting of income out of developed countries is a widely debated issue, empirical evidence 
on the magnitude of the problem and on the factors driving income shifting is scarce. This paper 
contributes to the debate as follows. Firstly, we review the literature on tax avoidance and evasion 
through border crossing income shifting out of developing countries. Secondly, we discuss methods 
and available datasets which can be used to gain new insights into the problem of corporate income 
shifting.  
 
There is a growing number of empirical studies on corporate profit shifting in OECD countries. Many 
of these studies use appropriate data and sophisticated econometric methods, and the results offer 
valuable insights into corporate profit shifting. Unfortunately, almost none of these studies include 
developing countries. The main reason is that, for developing countries, much less data is available. 
There is a number of studies, mostly published by non governmental organisations (NGOs), which try 
to estimate income shifting and tax revenue losses suffered by developing countries.1
 
 These studies 
have the merit of attracting the attention of a wider public to the issue of income shifting out of 
developing countries. But the results of these studies are partly difficult to interpret, mainly because 
the measurement concepts used have a number of drawbacks (Fuest and Riedel (2009)).    
                                                 
1 These studies are reviewed in Fuest and Riedel (2009).  
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The setup of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section two, we briefly introduce the concept of 
profit shifting by multinational firms and discuss empirical approaches which have been used to detect 
profit shifting. In section 3, we review existing studies on profit shifting out of developing countries. 
This section builds on and extends our earlier work in Fuest and Riedel (2009). Section 4 discusses the 
particular role of tax havens. In section 5, we suggest and discuss the pros and cons of different 
econometric identification strategies and datasets which can be used to gain new insights into the 
phenomenon of profit shifting out of developing countries. We also provide some  evidence from one 
of the datasets, which supports the view that a significant amount of profit shifting out of developing 
countries and into tax havens does take place. Section 6 concludes.    
  
2. Multinational Firms and the Concept of Profit Shifting2
 
 
2.1 Intra Firm Profit Shifting 
 
For purposes of taxation, the profits of a multinational firm have to be allocated to the individual 
jurisdictions where the firm files for income taxation. This is usually done through the method of 
separate accounting. Each entity (subsidiary or permanent establishment) of the multinational firm 
individually calculates the income it has generated. Transactions between different entities of a 
multinational firm (controlled transactions) should, in principle, be treated as transactions with third 
parties (uncontrolled transactions). However, multinational firms may use controlled transactions to 
shift income across countries. For instance, they may shift income from high tax jurisdictions to low 
tax jurisdictions using transfer pricing or intra firm debt.  
 
The concept of income shifting raises the question of whether a ‘true’ or ‘objective’ distribution of 
profits earned by individual entities of a multinational firm can be identified. Achieving this is 
complicated for a number of reasons. In particular, entities of multinational firms typically jointly use 
resources specific to the firm like e.g. a common brand name or firm specific know how. Pricing these 
resource flows appropriately is difficult because goods traded between unrelated parties are usually 
different. It is an important characteristic of many multinational firms that the individual entities 
jointly use resources which could not be used in the same way if they were separate firms. If they 
could, there would be no reason to create the multinational firm in the first place. For this reason, it is 
difficult to establish what a profit distribution in the absence of profit shifting would look like. 
                                                 
2 Sections 2,3 and 4 build upon and extend the analysis in Fuest and Riedel (2009). 
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Most empirical studies on corporate income shifting, however, do not explicitly refer to a hypothetical 
distribution of profits which would occur in the absence of income shifting. Instead, they focus on 
particular factors which are likely to drive income shifting and try to explore whether these factors 
affect the distribution of reported income across countries and, if so, how large these effects are. In 
this paper, we focus on tax induced income shifting. Empirical work in this area essentially uses two 
types of approaches to investigate whether and to what extent firms shift income to exploit tax 
differences across countries. The first approach directly looks at the use of instruments for profit 
shifting. For instance, some studies focus on income shifting through debt and ask whether, other 
things equal, multinational firms use more debt in high tax countries than in low tax countries (see e.g. 
Büttner and Wamser (2007) or Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008)). Other instruments which 
have been studied in the context of international profit shifting are transfer pricing (see e.g. Clausing 
(2003)) and the location of intangible assets (Dischinger and Riedel (2008)). 
 
The second approach focuses on the result of tax induced profit shifting, the overall profitability of 
individual entities of multinational firms in different countries. In the presence of tax induced income 
shifting, one would expect to observe a negative correlation between reported profitability and tax 
levels (see e.g. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and Weichenrieder (2009)). 
One drawback of this approach is that a negative correlation between pre tax profitability and tax 
levels may even emerge in the absence of income shifting. The reason is that the location of economic 
activity itself is influenced by taxes. Firms have incentives to locate highly profitable projects in low 
tax jurisdictions.  
 
Both approaches deliver estimates of the (marginal) impact of tax differences on income shifting 
behaviour. Under certain assumptions, these estimates can be used to calculate a hypothetical profit 
distribution across countries which would occur in the absence of tax differences. For instance, 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) analyze a sample of European multinational firms and find that, in 1999, 
the corporate tax base of Germany, which was the country with the highest corporate tax rate in 
Europe, would have increased by 14% if there had been no tax incentives to shift income to other 
countries.3
                                                 
3 Note that the data used in this study (the Amadeus database) is not representative for all European firms, although it does 
include most of the large firms. Therefore, the qualitative insight provided by this study, the result that a significant 
amount of income is shifted to low tax jurisdictions in Europe is probably more robust than the number of 14% for 
Germany.  
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2.2. Profit shifting and transactions between unrelated parties 
 
Profit shifting as discussed in the previous section takes place through transactions between entities of 
multinational firms in different countries. If two corporations located in two different countries belong 
to the same multinational firm or are controlled by the same interest, it is uncontroversial that 
transactions between these two firms may be used to shift profits across borders. However, some 
authors have argued that transactions between unrelated firms may also be used to shift profits across 
borders. This is emphasized in particular by Raymond Baker in his book Capitalism's Achilles Heel: 
Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market system. There, he quantifies the yearly illicit 
financial flows out of developing countries through the business sector with US-$ 500 to 800 billion.  
 
Baker’s book provides a break-down of this number into different activities. The analysis claims that 
slightly above 60% of these financial flows is related to legal commercial activities whereas the rest is 
assigned to criminal activity. Baker argues that money earned on legal commercial activities leaves 
developing countries through three potential channels: the mispricing of goods traded between 
independent parties, the distortion of transfer prices charged on goods traded within a multinational 
firm, and fake transactions.  
 
With respect to mispricing between unrelated parties, Baker bases his estimate on 550 interviews he 
conducted in the early 1990s with officials from trading companies in 11 countries: the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Brazil, India, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Since Baker assured anonymity, he does not make the data publicly available but argues 
that the data contains appropriate information on trading practices. 
 
He reports that the interviewees confirmed collusion between importers and exporters to draw money 
out of developing countries to be common practice. Specifically, he states that “mispricing in order to 
generate kickbacks into foreign bank accounts was treated as a well-understood and normal part of 
transactions” (p.169) by the interviewed managers. As a result of this study, Baker estimates that 50% 
of foreign trade transactions with Latin American countries are mispriced by on average around 10% 
adding to a worldwide average mispricing of goods traded between third parties of 5%. Similar, 
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slightly larger figures are reported for countries in Africa and Asia suggesting mispricing of 5% to 
7%. 
 
The possibility of mispricing in uncontrolled transactions plays a role for the interpretation of studies 
on income shifting through mispricing and will be discussed further below. 
 
3. Studies on international profit shifting in developing countries 
 
Most existing empirical studies on tax induced profit shifting focus on OECD countries. Studies on 
profit shifting in developing countries are scarce. Most studies on tax induced profit shifting (as well 
as income shifting motivated by other reasons) in developing countries have been published by NGOs. 
Below, we will discuss and criticise some of these studies. It should be emphasized, though, that these 
studies have the merit of attracting the attention of a wider public to this important issue.  
 
3.1. The Trade Mispricing Approach 
 
Studies based on the so-called trade mispricing approach start with the idea that firms may manipulate 
prices of internationally traded goods in order to shift income across countries. This idea is known 
from empirical work on income shifting in developed countries (see Clausing (2003) and the literature 
cited there). The key question is how the manipulation of prices is identified. There are different 
identification strategies with very different implications.  
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, Baker (2005) uses interviews to estimate the extent of 
mispricing in trade transactions with developing countries. He quantifies the income shifted out of 
developing countries through mispricing activities by multiplying the low end of his interview based 
mispricing estimate (i.e. mispricing of 5% of import and export value respectively) with the sum of 
imports and exports of developing countries, which is equal to approximately US-$ 4 trillion. Given 
this, he arrives at what he refers to as a lower-bound estimate of capital outflows due to trade of US-$ 
200 billion.4
 
  
                                                 
4 This number includes third-party and related-party trade.  
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The main disadvantage of Baker's approach to estimate capital outflows is that it is based on a 
relatively small number of interviews, and these interviews are confidential. Therefore the results 
cannot be replicated.  
 
Another approach to identifying mispricing is used by Pak (2007)5
 
, who identifies abnormally priced 
import and export transactions through the so-called "price filter matrix" approach. The basic idea can 
be summarized as follows: trade statistics offer information on the prices of transactions for individual 
product groups. For instance, US trade statistics offer information about the prices of fridges which 
have been imported into the country in a given year. The price filter approach classifies all 
transactions with prices which exceed the average price for imported fridges by a certain amount (for 
instance, by being in the upper quartile of the price range) as overpriced while all transactions with 
prices sufficiently far below the average price in that product group as underpriced. On this basis, 
income shifted into and out of the country is calculated. Pak (2007) does so as follows: “The dollar 
amounts are computed by aggregating the amount deviated from lower quartile price for every 
abnormally low priced U.S. import and the amount deviated from upper quartile price for every 
abnormally high priced U.S. export.”Ibid, p.120)  
The analysis in Pak (2007) leads to the result that US imports from all other countries around the 
world were underpriced by approximately US-$ 202 billion in 2005, or 12.1% of total imports. The 
value of US exports in the same year was overpriced by $ 50 billion or 5.5% of overall exports. 
Zdanowicz, Pak and Sullivan (1999) investigate the international merchandise statistics between the 
US and Brazil and find that the amount of income shifted due to abnormal pricing is between 11.13% 
for under-invoiced exports from Brazil and 15.23 % for overinvoiced imports to Brazil. Pak et al. 
(2003) use the same framework to investigate capital outflows from Greece due to mispricing of 
internationally traded goods and services. The percentage of income shifted from Greece to the world 
varies between 2.04% for underinvoiced exports from Greece and 5.88% for overinvoiced imports to 
Greece. 
 
Another study using this approach has been published recently by Christian Aid (2009). They argue 
that profit shifting out of developing countries through trade mispricing in the period 2005-2007 was 
above one trillion US-$ (Christian Aid (2009), p.5), giving rise to a yearly tax revenue loss of US-$ 
                                                 
5 See also Zdanowicz et al. (1999), Pak et al. (2003) and Boyrie et al. (2005).  
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121.8 billion per year.6
 
 Using the same approach, Christian Aid (2008) calculate a tax revenue loss 
suffered by developing countries due to trade mispricing of US-$ 160 billion in 2008. 
The mispricing approach as employed in these studies has the advantage of being simple and 
transparent. It uses publicly available data, and it is straightforward to replicate the results of existing 
studies. Unfortunately, the results of this type of analysis are difficult to interpret and effectively 
reveal little reliable information about income shifting in the context of tax avoidance and evasion, for 
the following reasons.  
 
Firstly, it is likely that, to some extent, price differences within product groups simply reflect quality 
differences.7 If there are price differences within product groups, it would be natural to assume that 
developing countries tend to export low-end/low-price products whereas developed countries export 
high-end products with higher prices. Chinese exports are an example for this pattern, as recently 
demonstrated by Schott (2008). How this affects the results of income shifting calculations depends on 
whether or not trade volumes of different countries in a given product group are considered jointly to 
identify mispricing. If they are considered jointly, and if the quality pattern is as described above, the 
mispricing approach systematically overestimates income shifting from developing to developed 
countries. If they are considered separately, this cannot happen, but in this case goods which are 
classified as overpriced in one country may be counted as underpriced in another country. This is 
inconsistent. As long as it is not possible to disentangle quality differences and income shifting, the 
interpretation of numbers generated by the mispricing approach is difficult. 8
 
  
Secondly, identifying the highest and the lowest quartile of observed prices as abnormal prices implies 
that any price distribution with some variance would be diagnosed to include overpricing and 
underpricing, even if the observed price differences are small or are driven by factors other than 
mispricing. Empirical analysis should normally allow for the possibility that a hypothesis – in this 
case, the hypothesis that income is shifted from developing to developed countries – is not supported 
by the data. This is excluded by assumption, unless all prices within a commodity group are identical.  
 
                                                 
6 Some of these estimates are also referred to in TJN (2007,2009). 
7 Pak (2007, p.119) does mention that “Abnormally priced imports and exports may be due to heterogeneity of products 
within a given harmonized commodity code classification…” but he does not discuss the implications this may have for 
the analysis.   
8 Price volatility over time may also be an issue. But this is not specific to the mispricing method discussed here.  
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Thirdly, what makes the results difficult to interpret is that the counterfactual is not clear. Assume 
that, in one period, there is only one transaction in the upper quartile price range and one transaction in 
the lower quartile price range. All other transactions are priced below the upper quartile price and 
above the lower quartile price. In this case, the counterfactual, which is a hypothetical situation 
without mispricing, should be that the two mispriced transactions disappear or adjust their prices to be 
within the inner quartile price range. But now assume that, in the next period, the two transactions 
identified as mispriced in the first period take place at corrected prices, which are between the upper 
and lower quartile price identified for the preceding period; everything else remains the same. In this 
case, the quartile price ranges for the second period would change, and transactions which were not 
identified as mispriced in the previous period are now identified as mispriced. This inconsistency 
occurs because there is no well defined counterfactual.   
 
Fourthly, the price filter method by construction identifies overpriced as well as underpriced 
transactions, so that it always identifies income shifting in two directions: into and out of the country 
under consideration. But many studies using the approach only report income shifting in one direction 
and ignore income shifting into the other direction. For instance, Pak (2007) reports underpriced 
imports into the US (table 2 p. 121) and overpriced US exports (table 3, p.122), but overpriced imports 
and underpriced exports (both of which would shift income out of the US) are neglected.9
 
 A similar 
approach is used by Christian Aid (2009) and other studies.  
The restriction to one direction of income shifting leads to highly misleading results if the findings are 
used to estimate the impact of income shifting on corporate income tax revenue collected by a 
particular country or group of countries, as e.g. in Christian Aid (2008, 2009). A meaningful estimate 
of the tax revenue effects would have to take into account profit shifting in both directions. To see 
this, consider the following simple example: Assume that there are three exporters of a good in 
country A. Firm 1 exports the good at a price of 4, firm 2 exports the good at a price of 8 and firm 3 
exports the good at a price of 12. The mispricing approach would identify the transaction at a price of 
4 as underpriced and the transaction at a price of 12 as overpriced. Assume further that all firms have 
costs of 4 in country A which are deductible from the profit tax base in country A. The goods are 
exported to country B, where all three are sold at a price of 14 to consumers in country B.  
                                                 
9 GFI (2009) exploits discrepancies in trade volumes reported by exporting and importing countries to identify income 
shifting (the GER method). This study also reports illicit flows out of developing countries and neglects flows into 
developing countries. This may lead to biased results. For instance, in cases where the discrepancies are exclusively a 
result of unsystematic measurement errors, with an expected value of zero, the GER approach would still indicate a capital 
outflow.   
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In this example, the aggregate corporate income tax base in country A is equal to 12. Firm 1 shifts 
income out of country A and firm 3 shifts income into country A. In the absence of trade mispricing, 
the tax base in A would be the same. The tax revenue loss of country A due to mispricing is equal to 
zero. A method which only takes into account firm 1 and neglects the implications of mispricing by 
firm 3 is clearly misleading. The same applies to the impact of income shifting on country B. 
 
What happens if other taxes are considered? For instance, one could be interested in measuring import 
duty revenue losses due to avoidance or evasion. Assume that there is a proportional import duty in 
country B. In this case, it is easy to check that tax revenue is again the same in the two cases under 
consideration, and it is of key importance to take into account both under- and overpriced imports to 
B. Note also that, in this case, firms would have an incentive to systematically understate the import 
price.10
 
 If this happens, income is shifted into the country. This is another reason why neglecting 
income shifting into developing countries is not appropriate in the context of studies on tax avoidance 
and evasion. Depending on the question asked, it may be appropriate to consider either net flows or 
gross flows, but reporting flows in one direction only and ignoring the flows into the other direction is 
not appropriate and may easily lead to misunderstandings.  
Pak (2007) defends his approach by claiming that the price filter method he uses is also applied by the 
IRS (IRS regulation 482) to deal with transfer pricing issues. This is not correct. IRS regulation 482 
stipulates that this method can only be applied to uncontrolled transactions (see section 1.482-1e) iii 
(C)), which means that only transactions between unrelated parties can be taken into account when 
assessing whether or not a transfer price is acceptable. Transactions within multinational firms must 
be excluded. The reason is that transactions between unrelated parties are more likely to reflect 
undistorted prices. Effectively, the IRS approach compares transactions between unrelated firms to 
transactions between related firms. In contrast, Pak (2007) applies the price filter method to all 
transactions, including transactions between related parties. This is fundamentally different. 
 
An approach which does use a method consistent with IRS regulation 482 is used in a study of trade 
mispricing by Clausing (2003). This study focuses on US external trade, however, not on developing 
countries in particular. Clausing (2003) compares prices of trade transactions between related parties 
                                                 
10 Note that, if all firms in our example cut their price by one unit to avoid paying import duties, revenue from import 
duties would decline but the mispricing approach would fail to identify any change. 
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to transactions between unrelated parties and shows that the differences are significantly influenced by 
tax rate differences. For instance, in transactions between related parties, prices of exports from high 
tax countries to low tax countries are higher than prices of transactions between unrelated parties. This 
suggests that multinational firms do try to reduce the taxes they have to pay by manipulating transfer 
prices. Of course, one could argue that mispricing is also likely to happen in transactions between 
unrelated parties. For instance, an exporter located in a low tax country and an importer in a high tax 
country could agree to increase the price of the transaction. This agreement could include a payment 
the exporter makes to the importer. Such a payment would have to be concealed from the tax 
authorities. If this happens, the approach used in Clausing (2003) systematically understates the 
impact of tax differences on profit shifting through transfer pricing. However, a mere price 
manipulation in a transaction between related parties is much easier than a price manipulation, 
combined with a concealed side payment by which the importer would participate in the tax savings. 
  
3.2. Profitability and profit shifting 
 
As mentioned in section 2, a second approach to measuring income shifting directly considers the 
profitability of firms and asks whether the observed profitability pattern can be explained as a result of 
income shifting. As in the case of mispricing, the insights provided by this type of study depend on 
how exactly profit shifting is identified. Oxfam (2000) estimates that tax revenue losses due to 
corporate profits shifted out of developing countries are equal to US-$ 50 billion per year. This 
number is calculated as follows. Oxfam multiplies the FDI stock in developing countries (US-$ 1219 
billion in 1998, retrieved from UNCTAD, 1999) with a Worldbank estimate for the return on FDI in 
developing countries of 16 to 18%. The authors argue that the true estimate for the return on FDI is 
even higher since the Worldbank figure does not account for profit shifting activities. Thus, they set 
the rate of return to 20%. Next, the paper assumes an average tax rate of 35% and thus derives a 
hypothetical corporate tax payment of around US-$ 85 billion. Since the actual tax payments received 
are around US-$ 50 billion, according to Oxfam (2000), this leaves a tax gap of US-$ 35 billion. 
Oxfam (2000) augments this figure with revenue foregone due to the evasion of income from financial 
assets held abroad, which is estimated to equal US-$ 15 billion. This leads to the estimated tax 
revenue losses of US-$ 50 billion.  
 
This approach raises a number of questions. Firstly, an important weakness of this calculation is to 
assume that, with perfect compliance, all income from foreign direct investment would effectively be 
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taxed at a rate of 35%. The issue is not that the average headline corporate tax rate may have been 
closer to 30%11
 
, as Oxfam (2000) recognizes. The key issue is that this approach neglects the 
existence of tax incentives for corporate investment. In the developing world, these investment 
incentives play a much larger role than in developed countries (see e.g. Klemm (2009) and Keen and 
Mansour (2008)). Many developing countries use tax incentives like e.g. tax holidays or free 
economic zones which offer low or zero corporate taxes, to attract foreign investment. It is 
controversial whether these incentives are efficient from a national or global welfare point of view 
(see also OECD 2001), but their revenue impact should be distinguished from the impact of tax 
avoidance and evasion. Neglecting this implies that the revenue losses due to evasion and avoidance 
are overestimated.  
Secondly, the return on FDI is not identical with the corporate tax base. For instance, if foreign direct 
investment is financed by debt, it cannot be expected that the contribution of the investment to the 
corporate tax base will be 20% of this investment because interest is deductible from the tax base.  
 
Finally, one should note that this type of analysis is purely descriptive and does not investigate the 
factors driving profit shifting. Taxation may not be the main factor which causes income shifting out 
of developing countries. Other factors like e.g. the threat of expropriation or confiscation of private 
property, economic and political uncertainty, fiscal deficits, financial repression or devaluation may be 
the real driving forces as pointed out e.g. by Boyrie et al. (2005). Thus, a shortcoming of the estimates 
mentioned above, as well as some the approaches discussed in the preceding sections, is that they 
reveal nothing about the reasons for profit shifting out of the developing world.  
 
As mentioned in section 2, there is a growing literature which investigates the role played by taxation 
as a factor which drives income shifting. Unfortunately most of this work focuses on OECD countries, 
rather than developing countries. Grubert and Mutti (1991) do analyse profit shifting of U.S. 
multinational firms and use a dataset which includes developed as well as developing countries. They 
show that firms systematically report higher taxable profits in countries with lower tax rates. In their 
analysis, firms in countries with a tax rate of 40 % would report an average ratio of pre tax profit and 
sales of 9.3 per cent whereas firms in countries with a tax rate of 20 per cent would report a profit 
                                                 
11 KPMG (1998) reports an average corporate income tax rate of 35.67 % for OECD countries, 32.30% for non-OECD 
Asian-Pacific countries and 32.03% for Latin American countries.   
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sales ratio of 15.75 per cent. This suggests that some profit shifting which is motivated by taxation 
does occur. 12
 
 
In a recent paper, Azemar (2008) investigates how the effectiveness of law enforcement affects profit 
shifting. Interacting a summary measure of law enforcement quality and tax profit ratios of firms in 
her regressions, she finds that a low quality of law enforcement goes along with a high sensitivity of 
tax payments to corporate tax rates. Her interpretation of this observation is that countries with 
ineffective law enforcement have greater difficulties to effectively implement anti tax avoidance 
measures like e.g. thin capitalization rules or transfer pricing corrections. This suggests that 
developing countries are more vulnerable to income shifting than developed countries. 
 
4. The role of tax havens  
 
Tax havens are widely seen as playing a major role for tax avoidance and tax evasion by multinational 
firms as well as individual taxpayers. Empirical research about income shifting to tax havens faces the 
difficulty that data on economic activity in these countries is scarce. Nevertheless, there are some 
studies on tax avoidance and evasion in tax havens and on the impact of tax havens on tax revenue 
collection by other countries. Unfortunately, these studies usually do not focus on developing 
countries.  
 
Firstly, there are estimates of tax revenues foregone due to the existence of tax havens made by 
NGOs. But these are partly related to the potential impact of tax havens on tax rates set by other 
countries. For instance, Oxfam (2000) estimates that developing countries as a whole may be losing 
annual tax revenues of at least US-$ 50 billion as a result of tax competition and the use of tax havens 
(p.6). Oxfam argues that “tax competition, and the implied threat of relocation, has forced developing 
countries to progressively lower corporate tax rates on foreign investors. Ten years ago these rates 
were typically in the range of 30-35 per cent- broadly equivalent to the prevailing rate in most OECD 
countries. Today, few developing countries apply corporate tax rates in excess of 20 per cent. 
Efficiency considerations account for only a small part of this shift, suggesting that tax competition 
                                                 
12 Of course, it has to be taken into account that other factors may play a role. For instance, firms might systematically 
choose low tax countries as locations of profitable, mobile investment projects.  
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has been a central consideration. If developing countries were applying OECD corporate tax rates 
their revenues would be at least US-$ 50 billion higher.”13
 
  
The issue here is that it is not clear to which extent the decline in corporate income tax rates which has 
occurred in both developing and developed countries is caused by tax havens. Tax rate competition 
would exist even in the absence of tax havens. In addition, some authors even argue that, under certain 
circumstances, tax havens may reduce the intensity of tax competition (Hong and Smart (2009)). Of 
course, the empirical relevance of this analysis remains to be investigated.  
 
However, the main critique of tax havens is not that they force other countries to cut taxes. It is the 
perception that these countries offer opportunities for tax avoidance or tax evasion to multinational 
firms and individual taxpayers residing in other countries, so that other countries suffer tax revenue 
losses. One estimate of tax revenue losses due to the existence of tax havens has been published by the 
Tax Justice Network (TJN, 2005). TJN starts with estimates of global wealth in financial assets 
published by Banks and Consultancy Firms (a report by Merrill Lynch and Cap Gemini for 1998 and a 
report by Boston Consulting Group from 2003). This is combined with estimates of the share of 
financial assets held offshore by the Bank for International Settlement (which refers to US asset 
holdings, though). By combining these numbers, TJN (2005) claims that offshore holdings of financial 
assets are approximately US-$ 9.5 trillion. This is augmented by US-$ 2 trillion of non-financial 
wealth held offshore like e.g. real estate (no source is given for this number). On this basis, TJN 
(2005) estimates that globally approximately US-$ 11.5 trillion of assets are held offshore. Assuming 
an average return on these assets of 7.5 percent implies that these offshore assets yield a return of US-
$ 860 billion. Moreover, the TJN assumes that these assets are taxable at 30% and thus calculates a 
revenue loss of US-$ 255 billion per year (in 2005).  
 
The analysis in TJN (2005) does not try to estimate which part of these revenue losses occur in 
developing countries. Cobham (2005) uses the TJN (2005) results and estimates the share of 
developing countries as follows: Since 20% of worldwide GDP is accounted for by middle and low-
income countries and given that offshore wealth holdings are not less likely in the developing world, 
20% of the revenue loss can be assigned to these countries, i.e. US-$ 51 billion.  
 
                                                 
13 Another estimate by Weyzig and van Dijk (2008) argues that the tax haven features of the Netherlands alone lead to a 
loss of more than € 100 million to developing countries. 
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Other estimates of these revenue losses use similar methods. Oxfam (2000) calculates revenue losses 
due to evasion of income from financial assets held abroad of around US-$ 15 billion per year. This 
result is mainly driven by an estimate for foreign asset holdings of residents in developing countries 
from 1990 (US-$ 700 billion), which is now outdated. In a more recent study, Oxfam (2009) estimates 
that US-$ 6.2 trillion of developing country wealth is held offshore by individuals. This leads to an 
estimated annual tax loss to developing countries of between US-$ 64 - 124 billion. 
 
It is difficult to interpret these estimates for tax revenue losses due to offshore wealth holdings. They 
do not unambiguously over- or underestimate the revenue losses, but they rely on a large number of 
strong assumptions. These include the assumptions on the distribution of asset holdings across the 
developed and the developing world as well as taxable rates of return and average tax rates. In 
addition, there are several open questions which have to be addressed. First, it is unclear whether all 
income from offshore wealth holdings is taxable on a residence basis. Some developing countries do 
not tax the foreign source income of residents because it may not be administratively efficient to do so 
(Howard (2001), p. 259). Second, even if savings income is taxable on a residence basis, taxes paid in 
the source country may be deductible from tax in the residence country. Third, it is unlikely that all 
income from financial assets held offshore evades taxation in the country of residence of the owners. 
There may be other than tax reasons for offshore holdings of financial assets, and it is possible that 
owners of these assets declare their income in their countries of residence. To the extent that these 
assets generate passive investment income, they will also be subject to Controlled Foreign 
Corporations Legislation, which means that this income is excluded from deferral of home country 
taxation or exemption granted to active business income.  
 
Here, further research is needed to e.g. determine the causal effect of the presence in tax haven 
countries on tax revenues paid by multinational affiliates in the developing world. Such an 
investigation should follow work by Desai et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Maffini (2009). These papers 
study the role of tax havens for the US and the European Union. In the next section, we discuss 
methods and datasets which can be used to do similar work on developing countries.  
 
 
5. Data Sets and Identification Strategies for Assessing Tax Evasion and Avoidance in 
Developing Countries 
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Attempts to assess whether and to what extent (multinational) firms in developing countries engage in 
international tax evasion and tax avoidance activities have long been hampered by a lack of 
appropriate data. Thus, existing evidence on the issue is largely anecdotal in nature with the exception 
of a small number of studies reviewed in the previous section. As many of these papers face 
methodological difficulties and the identification strategies partly rely on strong assumptions, more 
research is needed to identify and quantify corporate tax avoidance and evasion in the developing 
world. In recent years, a number of data sets became available which may suit for this purpose. In the 
following, we will review a selection of these data bases and discuss potential identification strategies. 
The analysis will focus on micro data sources as we consider these to be better suited to identify 
corporate profit shifting activities than macro level data since they are less prone to give rise to 
endogeneity problems in the estimation strategy.  
 
5.1. Identification Strategies 
 
The basis for a valid empirical identification strategy is to develop and test hypotheses which derive 
effects that are unlikely to capture things other than corporate profit shifting. In the following, we will 
discuss two identification strategies that from our point of view largely fulfil this requirement and 
which can be applied to micro level data. 
 
The first identification strategy builds on the notion that companies in developing countries differ with 
respect to their flexibility and opportunities to shift income out of their host countries. For example, 
companies which are part of a multinational group can plausibly undertake profit shifting activities 
more easily than firms without affiliates in foreign countries. This is because they can transfer profits 
to an affiliated company abroad.14
 
 Moreover, firms which belong to multinational groups with tax 
haven affiliates have particularly good opportunities to transfer income out of developing countries. 
Thus, they can be expected to engage in even larger profit shifting activities. Consequently, the 
identification strategy is to compare profit shifting measures for the treatment group of multinational 
firms (with tax haven connections) to a control group of national firms which are expected not to 
engage in significant profit shifting activities.  
                                                 
14 As discussed in section 2, there is anecdotal evidence (e.g. by Baker, 2004) that national companies also engage in profit 
shifting activities by colluding with unrelated parties in foreign countries. However, given the transaction costs of these 
arrangements, previous academic papers (e.g. Clausing, 2003) consider the associated volumes of multinational profit 
shifting to be quantitatively minor in comparison to profit shifting activities of multinational groups.    
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To identify profit shifting activities in this context, researchers need detailed information on corporate 
ownership structures and on company variables which are expected to capture profit shifting activities. 
According to previous empirical studies on corporate shifting activities in the industrialized world (see 
e.g. Clausing (2003), Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Buettner and Wamser (2006), Dischinger and 
Riedel (2008)), multinational firms use different channels to transfer taxable resources out of 
countries, the most important ones being the distortion of intra-firm trade prices and the debt-equity 
structure as well as the relocation of profitable assets like corporate patents. To test for this type of 
profit shifting thus requires associated information on trade prices, debt levels and patents. As this is 
often not available, researchers may also exploit information on corporate pre-tax profits and 
corporate tax payments as profit shifting outflows are expected to lower both variables. Thus, 
following the above identification strategy, we expect that multinational firms in developing countries 
(especially those with a tax haven connection) report lower pre-tax profits per unit of assets, pay lower 
taxes per unit of assets and per unit of profit, respectively, hold higher fractions of (intra-firm) debt 
and exhibit stronger distortions of intra-firm trade prices (i.e. enlarged import prices and diminished 
export prices) than the control group of national firms. The obvious challenge of this identification 
strategy is to empirically account for a potential selection of firms with differing characteristics into 
the control group (national firms) and the treatment group (multinational firms (with a tax haven 
connection)). Strategies to solve this problem have been presented in earlier papers for the developed 
world (see e.g. Desai et al. 2006; Maffini, 2009; Egger et al. 2007). If after accounting for all these 
issues, no differences between the considered profit shifting variables for national and multinational 
firms is found, the profit shifting hypothesis is rejected.  
 
A second identification strategy starts with the question of why companies shift profits out of the 
developing world. One motive might be that they want to save on tax payments. A second might be 
that they draw their money out of corrupt and politically unstable countries where they are prone to 
threats of expropriation. To test for these hypotheses implies to determine whether companies in 
countries with a high-tax rate and/or a high corruption rate report lower pre-tax profits per assets, pay 
lower taxes on their assets and profits, have higher debt-to-equity ratios and more strongly distorted 
intra-firm transfer prices. In this case, again the challenge is to ensure that the identified effect 
between taxation/corruption and the profit shifting measures is not driven by an unobserved 
heterogeneity of firms which are located in high-tax (high-corruption) countries and low-tax (low-
corruption) countries. This requires including a set of control variables which capture differences 
between affiliates and host countries. The most convincing approach here is to include a set of affiliate 
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fixed effects into a panel data regression which implies that the researcher accounts for all time-
constant affiliate differences and the identification is achieved via corporate adjustments to changes in 
taxes and/or the corruption level. Again, for this identification strategy to be applied, stringent data 
requirements have to be met. Ideally, accounting data on pre-tax profits, tax payments, debt-levels or 
intra-firm transfer prices should be available in panel format for several years as should be 
information on corporate taxes and/or the level of corruption and political stability.15
 
  
5.2. Data Sets 
 
A number of data sets may fulfil the requirements associated with the two identification strategies laid 
out above. In the following, we will present a selection of these data bases. In a first step, we will 
discuss one of the data sources, ORBIS, in some depth. In a second step, we will briefly describe 
alternative databases available for the purpose of testing tax avoidance in the developing world. 
 
5.2.1. ORBIS 
 
The ORBIS data provided by Bureau van Dijk contains information on companies worldwide (see 
Table A1 for a description of the data). While the majority of firms in ORBIS are located in 
industrialized economies, the data also contains information on countries in the developing world. 
ORBIS is available in different versions whereas the largest version of the data set in total comprises 
57 million firms. The data is collected from various (partly private and partly official) sources which 
may differ between countries. Consequently, it is a well-known problem of the ORBIS data that the 
firm coverage differs across countries, with some economies being comparably poorly represented. 
Not surprisingly, this problem is especially pronounced in developing countries. While the firm 
coverage tends to be particularly small in Africa, information on a sufficiently large number of firms 
is reported for several economies in Latin American, South America and Asia. Hence, we think that 
focussing on those developing economies for which good information is available allows using the 
ORBIS data for the purpose of identifying corporate profit shifting behavior.  
 
                                                 
15 Moreover, the analysis must comprise time periods in which the host countries included in the sample experienced tax 
reforms or changes in corruption and political stability.  
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ORBIS provides balance sheet information and data on profit and loss account items. Thus, it contains 
detailed information on pre-tax and after-tax profit (both operating profits and financial plus operating 
profits) as well as on tax payments and debt variables. Moreover, information on ownership linkages 
is included, precisely on linkages to all direct and indirect shareholders of the firm as well as to 
subsidiaries within the multinational group. Last, ORBIS provides address information (postcode and 
city name) which may allow researchers to determine the location of firms (or at least the headquarter) 
within developing countries and thus to identify, for instance, companies located in free economic 
zones or to determine the role of taxes levied at the regional level. Like with other data bases provided 
by private sources, it is important to stress that there may be issues regarding the quality of the ORBIS 
data. In line with previous papers, we however think that these problems can be handled by rigorous 
plausibility checks and data cleaning efforts.   
 
In the following, we will present and discuss descriptive statistics for some countries in the ORBIS 
data. Note that the ORBIS version available to us contains large and very large firms only. Analysing 
the full ORBIS version which also accounts for smaller firms is likely to enhance the firm coverage 
compared to our exercise. Moreover, we restrict the analysis to the Asian continent and only employ 
data for countries with a sufficient firm coverage. The countries included in the sample are China, 
Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand and Taiwan. Our final data set is a cross 
section of 87,561 firms for the year 2006 (see Table B1 for a country distribution).  
 
As the ORBIS data provides information on ownership connections between firms, it allows us to 
pursue the first identification strategy described in the previous section. We define a firm in a 
developing country to observe a direct link to a foreign economy if it directly owns a subsidiary in a 
foreign country with at least 50% of the ownership shares or if it is directly owned by a parent firm in 
a foreign country with at least 50% of the ownership shares.16
                                                 
16 Note that the information on ownership shares in ORBIS is missing for many cases in the sample. As the ownership 
information in general suggests that most firms are majority owned in our sample, we follow previous papers which 
worked with this data (see e.g. Budd et al., 2005) and assume majority ownership if the information on ownership 
percentages is missing. 
 Moreover, we adopt a second, less 
restrictive definition of a multinational firm which applies if any affiliate within the multinational 
group is located in a foreign country (including subsidiaries of the immediate or global ultimate owner 
which do not have a direct ownership link to the considered firm). According to these definitions, 
2,202 firms in our data set observe a direct ownership link to a foreign affiliate and 2,807 firms belong 
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to a multinational group in the broader sense that at least one affiliate in the group is located in a 
foreign country (irrespective of a direct or indirect ownership link).  
 
Here, a comment is in order as we face the potential challenge that information on some affiliates 
within the multinational group is missing in the data. If missing affiliates are located in foreign 
countries (from the point of view of the considered firm), then we might declare a corporation to be a 
national firm which is actually part of a multinational group. This misclassification, however, 
introduces noise into our analysis and is expected to bias the results against us. This implies that the 
results should be interpreted as a lower bound to the true effect.   
 
The same exercise is undertaken to identify firms with ownership linkages to affiliates in a tax haven 
country. A tax haven is defined according to the OECD’s tax haven list. Again, we define a group of 
firms to have a direct ownership link to a tax haven country if they directly own a tax haven subsidiary 
with at least 50% of the ownership shares or are directly owned by at least 50% of the ownership 
shares by a foreign parent firm in a tax haven.17
 
 In a second step, we moreover adopt a broader 
definition of tax haven linkages which identifies firms in our data which belong to multinational 
groups with a tax haven affiliate (irrespective of a direct or indirect ownership link). According to 
these definitions, 207 firms in our data observe a direct ownership link to a tax haven country while 
691 corporations belong to groups which observe a tax haven affiliate (directly or indirectly connected 
to the considered firm). Thus, according to the broader definition, 25% of the multinational firms in 
our sample observe an ownership link to a tax haven country while only 9% of the firms have a direct 
ownership link to a foreign tax haven.  
Again, we might face the problem that information may not be available for all affiliates which belong 
to a multinational group. As a large fraction of multinational firms from industrialized countries is 
known to operate subsidiaries in tax haven countries, we run a cross check on the data and restrict the 
analysis to firms which are owned by immediate and global ultimate owners (in foreign countries) and 
for which information on the owners’ subsidiary list is available. For this subgroup of firms, we find 
that 63% belong to multinational groups with a tax haven affiliate.18
                                                 
17 Again, we consider majority ownership if the ownership information is missing. 
 Nevertheless, we are again not 
too concerned about potential shortcoming of the data in this dimension as missing information on tax 
haven connections introduces noise into the estimation and biases our results against us.  
18 Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b) find that, in 1999, 59 per cent of US multinationals had affiliates in tax haven countries. 
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Thus, we compare different corporate variables which are expected to capture profit shifting activities 
for the subgroup of firms defined above. As mentioned above, the ORBIS data contains information 
on a wide range of accounting variables, including the unconsolidated corporate pre-tax profit, tax 
payments and debt-levels. In Table B2, we provide descriptive statistics which discriminate between 
first, all firms in the data; second, firms which belong to groups that own affiliates in a foreign 
country; third, firms which observe a direct ownership link via a parent firm or a subsidiary to a 
foreign country (this is thus a subset of the second group of firms); fourth, firms which belong to a 
multinational group that observes an affiliate in a tax haven country and fifth, firms which have a 
direct ownership link (via a direct parent firm or subsidiary) in a tax haven country. The rationale 
behind investigating groups with direct ownership linkages to foreign countries and tax havens 
separately is that group affiliates which are connected through direct ownership are presumed to be 
closer connected in an economic sense. This is expected to facilitate profit shifting between the 
entities.  
 
As table B2 shows, the firms included in the analysis on average have total asset investments of 23.3 
million US dollars. Not surprisingly, multinational firms observe larger asset stocks, with 98.1 million 
US dollars and 94.9 million US dollars for firms with any link to a foreign affiliate and firms with a 
direct link, respectively. Moreover, among the multinational firms, corporations with a tax haven 
linkage are reported to have higher total asset investments than other multinational firms with 140.5 
million US dollars and 172.3 million US dollars respectively (for firms with any link to a tax haven 
country and firms with a direct link to a tax haven respectively). All the differences are statistically 
significant as indicated by the 95% confidence intervals around the means. 
 
Moreover, the table presents the pre-tax profit per total assets reported by the companies in our sample 
which may be considered as a proxy for the firm’s corporate tax base.19
                                                 
19 To avoid distortions through outliers, we drop observations with a pre-tax profitability low -1 or a pre-tax profitability 
above 1. That, however, does not qualitatively affect our results. 
 The average pre-tax 
profitability for the firms in our sample is estimated with 0.092. Interestingly, multinational firms 
(irrespective of direct or indirect ownership linkages to foreign countries) observe a lower pre-tax 
profitability which is measured to be 0.071 on average and which is thus significantly lower than the 
average pre-tax profitability of the full sample as indicated by the 95% confidence interval around the 
mean. This result may seem counterintuitive at first sight as multinational firms are commonly found 
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to observe larger productivity rates than national firms (see e.g. Helpman et al., 2004) which would 
suggest them to also report larger pre-tax profitability values. However, as indicated above they may 
on the other hand side equally face more opportunities to engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion 
through international channels which may lower reported pre-tax profits in our sample countries (that 
do not comprise any tax haven). Or alternatively, the higher international mobility of their investments 
may endow them with a higher bargaining power against host country governments and allow them to 
obtain lower tax bases than less mobile national firms.    
 
Interestingly however, firms which belong to multinational groups that include tax haven affiliates do 
not report significantly lower profitability rates than national firms. As multinational firms with a tax 
haven linkage are presumed to face higher tax avoidance possibilities and probably also a higher 
willingness to take up avoidance and evasion opportunities, this suggests that multinationals with a tax 
haven connection are more profitable in their operations than other multinational firms. This picture 
prevails if we restrict the profitability variable to rates above zero.  
 
Moreover, Table B2 depicts the tax payments per total assets reported by the firms in our sample. The 
broad picture resembles the one for the profitability rates. While national firms  pay the highest taxes 
per total assets reported with an average of 0.018, the tax payments per total assets of multinational 
firms are significantly smaller and measured with 0.015 and 0.014 respectively (for firms belonging to 
multinational groups in general and firms with a direct ownership link to a foreign country 
respectively). The subgroup of multinational firms with a tax haven link does not observe significantly 
lower tax payments per total assets than national firms (which is likely driven by the profitability 
pattern discussed in the paragraphs above).  
 
Furthermore, we report descriptive statistics for the tax payments per pre-tax profit which are a proxy 
for the average tax rate of the observed firm.20
                                                 
20 In doing so, we restrict our sample to firms which observe a positive pre-tax profit. 
 The results suggest that again national firms face the 
highest average tax rate of 20% which is significantly larger than the average tax rate of multinational 
firms which is 16.9% and 16.4% respectively (for firms belonging to multinational groups in general 
and firms with a direct ownership link to a foreign country respectively). Among multinationals, the 
lowest average tax rate is faced by firms which belong to multinational groups with a tax haven 
linkage. Those firms pay 13.2% and 11.2% taxes on their profits (for firms with any tax haven link 
and firms with a direct tax haven link respectively) which is again significantly lower than the rates 
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faced by multinationals in general and thus, also significantly lower than the rates faced by national 
firms. This strongly suggests that firms with a tax haven connection indeed manage to significantly 
reduce their corporate tax burden.  
 
Furthermore, the ORBIS data includes information on corporate debt-ratios (calculated as debt over 
total assets). As (a fraction of) interest payments are commonly deductible from the corporate tax 
base, firms which want to reduce their corporate tax burden have an incentive to employ comparably 
high debt levels. This incentive generally applies to both, national and multinational firm whereas 
multinational firms (with a tax haven connection) have the additional opportunity to use intra-firm 
lending as a device to shift profits to a foreign country. The descriptive statistics in Table B2 suggest 
that multinational firms in fact, however, observe lower debt-ratios than their national counterparts 
indicating that debt shifting might not be a major device of multinational firms to transfer income 
abroad.  
 
To account for the fact that firms which belong to multinational groups (with tax haven connections) 
might differ in characteristics that may equally determine the described profit shifting measures, we 
also run a set of regressions which attempt to control for some of the potential source of heterogeneity. 
Table B3 presents the result of a simple OLS model which regresses the pre-tax profitability (defined 
as pre-tax profits over total assets) of the firms in our sample on two dummy variables indicating 
entities that belong to multinational groups in general and those that belong to groups with tax haven 
affiliates in particular. In Specifications (1) to (4), these definitions require the firm to have a direct 
ownership link to a foreign firm and tax haven affiliate respectively while the multinational and tax 
haven definition in Specifications (5) to (8) allows for indirect connections, too. Specification (1) 
presents the regression results without any control variables which derives analogous findings to the 
descriptive statistics in Table B2. Precisely, the results again suggest that firms which belong to 
multinational groups observe significantly lower reported pre-tax profits per total assets than national 
firms whereas the pre-tax profitability of firms belonging to multinational groups with a tax haven 
affiliation does not statistically differ from national firms. 
 
In Specifications (2) to (4), we include additional control variables to this estimation framework to 
account for heterogeneity in other firm characteristics. Precisely, in Specification (2), we add a full set 
of country fixed effects which absorbs time constant heterogeneity in the pre-tax profitability of firms 
in different sample countries. This renders the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable indicating 
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multinational firms insignificant and suggests that the pre-tax profitability of multinational firms in 
general and those with tax haven connections in particular does not differ from the one of national 
entities. In Specification (3), we moreover add a full set of two-digit industry dummies to account for 
heterogeneity in the profitability ratios of different industries which does not change the results. Last, 
Specification (4) additionally controls for the fact that profitability rates may vary with firm size and 
includes the logarithm of the firm’s total assets as an additional control variable. The coefficient 
estimate for the size effect turns out negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
indicates decreasing returns to scale, i.e. in our sample, large firms tend to report lower pre-tax 
profitability rates than small firms. Accounting for this, in turn derives positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates for the dummy variables indicating multinational firms (with tax 
haven connections). Hence, conditional on their size, multinational firms (with tax haven connections) 
report a larger pre-tax profitability than their national counterparts which is in line with previous 
evidence in the literature that suggests higher productivity – and in consequence higher profitability - 
levels of multinational firms. Specifications (5) to (8) re-estimate the regression model accounting for 
multinational firm and tax haven definitions that captures direct and indirect ownership linkages. This 
derives comparable results. 
 
In Table B4, we repeat the exercise and determine the connection between multinational ownership 
linkages (to tax haven affiliates) and the corporate tax payments per assets. Analogously to the 
previous table, Specification (1) regresses the corporate tax payment ratio on dummy variables 
indicating direct ownership links to foreign firms (in tax haven countries). Again, the results indicate 
that multinational firms in general tend to pay significantly less taxes on their total asset stock than 
national firms while the tax payments of multinational firms with a tax haven connection do not 
significantly differ. This result prevails if we account for a full set of country fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects in Specifications (2) and (3). In Specification (4), we additionally include a size 
control (the logarithm of total assets). Similar to the results in the previous table, the coefficient 
estimate for the size variable is negative and significant suggesting that the tax payments per total 
assets decrease in firm size. Moreover, conditional on firm size, the specifications indicate that 
multinational firms in general and especially those with a tax haven connection report larger tax 
payments per total assets than national firms. This result again may reflect that multinational firms 
tend to observe larger underlying productivity characteristics and hence earn higher profits per total 
assets which result in larger tax payments. 
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Last, we assess the difference in the average effective tax rate of national and multinational firms 
(with a tax haven connection) as measured by tax payments over the firm’s pre-tax profits. To do so, 
we restrict our sample to firms which observe both a positive pre-tax profit and non-negative tax 
payments. Specification (1) regresses the average tax burden on dummy variables indicating 
multinational firms (with tax haven connections) as determined by direct ownership linkages. 
Interestingly, the regression results suggest that multinational firms in general do not observe a lower 
average tax rate than their national counterparts while multinational corporations with tax haven 
linkages report a 5 percentage point lower average tax rate. Additionally controlling for a full set of 
country fixed effects and industry fixed effects equally renders the coefficient estimate for the 
multinational dummy negative and statistically significant suggesting that both, multinational firms in 
general and those with a tax haven connection pay lower taxes on their reported pre-tax profits 
compared to national firms. This result is moreover robust against including a size control into the 
model as presented in Specification (4). Quantitatively, the results suggest that multinational firms pay 
1 percentage points less taxes on their pre-tax profit than national corporations while multinational 
firms with a tax haven connection pay 4.4 percentage points less taxes on their profit. In Specifications 
(5) to (8) we rerun the regression accounting for indirect ownership linkages in the definition of the 
multinational dummy (with tax haven connections) and find comparable results.   
 
Thus, summing up, the results suggest that multinational firms tend to report higher pre-tax profits and 
tax payments per assets than comparable national firms which may reflect that they have a higher 
underlying productivity level. However, we also find that multinational firms, and especially those 
with a tax haven connection, face a significantly lower average tax burden, i.e. lower average tax 
payments per pre-tax profits.  
 
Nevertheless, also note that some caution is warranted when interpreting the results. As discussed 
above, an in-depth analysis requires us to account for selection of different firms in the groups of 
national corporations, multinationals and multinationals with an ownership link to avoid that the 
results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity between groups.21
                                                 
21 For example, it is not possible to conclude from the descriptive results presented in this paper that a tax haven ownership 
link causes a reduction in the firm’s average tax rate. It may be the case that firms with many shifting opportunities have a 
higher tendency to locate in tax haven countries.  
 One important issue in this respect 
is also to assess to what extent the difference in the average tax rates of national firms and 
multinationals (with a tax haven connection) is driven by the fact that multinationals tend to benefit 
from the location in special economic zones or receive special tax breaks by the countries’ 
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governments through other sources. This is methodologically feasible as demonstrated by previous 
studies for the industrialized countries (see e.g. Desai et. al., 2006; Maffini, 2009; Egger et al., 2007). 
An analogous analysis for the developing world, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper and is 
delegated to future research. 
 
Moreover, the structure of the ORBIS data also allows pursuing the second identification strategy, i.e. 
to determine how changes in the corporate tax rate and corruption parameters affect profit shifting 
variables. This is possible as ORBIS includes rich information on firm and group characteristics which 
may be used as control variables and ORBIS is available in a panel structure which allows controlling 
for time-constant differences between the affiliates. In the course of this paper, we only determine the 
correlation between the corporate statutory tax rate (obtained from various sources) and a corruption 
index (obtained from Transparency International) with the profit shifting variables named above and 
find small correlations only. Note that this, however, does not necessarily reflect that firms in the 
sample do not engage in profit shifting behaviour but in the contrary indicates that profit shifting 
measures are determined by several factors that correlate with the tax rate and corruption indices. 
These factors have to be accounted for in a regression framework to make meaningful statements 
about the effect of taxes/corruption on profit shifting behaviour. This is left to future research. 
5.2.2. Other Data Sources 
Apart from ORBIS, several other data sets may be used to analyse tax evasion and tax avoidance in 
developing economies. A comparable database to ORBIS is COMPUSTAT Global which is provided 
by Standard and Poor’s. The data comprises firm level information on balance sheet items and profit 
and loss accounts of companies around the world. Thus, information on pre-tax profits, corporate tax 
payments, debt levels, interest payments and R&D expenditure is included which allows to identify 
corporate profit shifting and to assess the importance of different profit shifting channels out of the 
developing world. In total, COMPUSTAT covers more than 30,000 companies in 100 countries, 
including several developing countries. The coverage is especially good in the Asian-Pacific region 
where information on almost 16,000 firms is available (see Table A2 for a description).  
 
The data has some drawbacks though. First, it lacks ownership information, i.e. it is not possible to 
link subsidiaries and parent firms in the data. Consequently, COMPUSTAT does not allow applying 
the first identification strategy as foreign firms and tax haven affiliates cannot be systematically 
identified. However, as the data is available in panel format for several years, it allows to pursue the 
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second identification strategy and to determine how tax rate changes and changes in the corruption 
index affect profit shifting measures. A second drawback of the data is that information is only 
provided for companies which are listed on a stock exchange. This imposes a sample restriction 
although large (listed) firms are likely to be the main profit shifters and thus profit shifting effects 
should nevertheless be identifiable. Third, as already stressed above, the data quality of data sets 
provided by private institutions has been criticized in the past.  
 
To address the latter concern, researchers may consider using data sources provided by official 
institutions which became available recently and allow for investigating tax avoidance and evasion in 
the developing world. These data sets comprise information on outward investments by multinational 
firms located in a respective country, the most widely known data sets being the US BEA firm-level 
dataset (see Table A3), the German Micro database on Direct Investment (MiDi) (see Table A4), the 
UK Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) (see Table A5). All three data sets 
comprise information on multinational parent firms in the respective countries and their foreign 
subsidiaries, including subsidiaries in the developing world. The main advantage of these data sources 
is that the reporting is mandatory by national law which suggests that the quality of the reported 
information is high. Moreover, commonly information on directly and indirectly held affiliates is 
available. Only the AFDI data is restricted to information on directly held subsidiaries. Despite some 
limitations, the data sets thus allow for studies based on the first identification strategy. 
 
Moreover, the data includes several variables which capture profit shifting behaviour like after-tax 
profits, information on tax payments and debt ratios. Nevertheless, the data is somewhat less 
comprehensive than in ORBIS or COMPUSTAT. Thus, both AFDI and MiDi include only 
information on company profits after taxation, not on pre-tax profits (whereas the former may be less 
suited to investigate profit shifting behaviour). MiDi also does not report any information on the 
foreign subsidiary’s tax bill in the contrary to AFDI and BEA. Nevertheless, one major advantage of 
these data sets is that they include information on intra-firm lending and intra-firm interest flows, 
which allows to test for debt shifting activities between affiliates.  
 
Additionally, in the US, researchers of the US treasury have access to confidential US firm-level data 
which is not available to the general public. The data includes information on US tax returns (see 
Table A6) and includes variables on the tax payments, profits and investments of US multinationals in 
the US and information on income and tax payments at foreign controlled companies including 
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subsidiaries in developing economies. Finally, Table A7 lists some other country-specific firm-level 
datasets which contain information on foreign activities of domestic companies. 
 
Last, data on international trade prices may be exploited to investigate profit shifting out of developing 
countries which takes place through trade mispricing (of multinational firms). Previous studies 
reviewed above use the United States Merchandise Trade Databases which contain price data for 
import-harmonized commodity codes and for export-harmonized commodity codes. The shortcoming 
of this data is that it hardly allows for a clear identification strategy to ferret out profit shifting 
behaviour. As the data does not discriminate between trade of related and unrelated parties, our first 
identification strategy is not applicable. This shortcoming can however be addressed by using a 
different data source: Clausing (2003) exploits data from the International Price Program of the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics which publishes information on 700 aggregate export and import price 
indexes. The data differentiates trade between related and unrelated parties which makes the control 
group approach feasible. Assuming that profit shifting via trade price distortions is negligible between 
third parties (see Clausing, 2003), trade prices of intra-firm trade between multinational affiliates can 
be compared to trade pricing between third parties. A different strategy to develop a valid 
identification strategy is to exploit the panel dimension of the trade price data which has not been done 
in existing studies. Precisely, one might investigate how trade prices are affected by policy reforms 
like tax rate changes or changes in the level of law enforcement or political stability in the partner 
countries, which implies that the countries without tax reforms serve as a control group.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The issue of tax avoidance and evasion through profit shifting out of developing countries is an 
important and widely debated issue. Yet, relatively little is known about the magnitude of and the 
factors driving profit shifting in the developing world. The main reason is that the available data is 
limited in terms of both quality and quantity. The results of most existing empirical studies on 
developing countries are difficult to interpret because the methods used to measure income shifting 
raise a number of issues. We have suggested and discussed a number of datasets, some of which have 
become available recently, and methods to do more research on profit shifting in the developing 
world. While these approaches also have their limitations, they do have the potential to improve our 
understanding of this important issue and to inform policies directed at crowding back tax avoidance 
and evasion in the developing world.     
 29 
 
References 
 
Azemar, Céline (2008), International Corporate Taxation and US Multinational’s Behaviour: An 
integrated Approach, Discussion Paper, August 2008. 
 
Azemar, Céline and Gregory Corcos (2009), Heterogeneity of Foreign Firms and Asymmetry in Tax 
Responsiveness: The Role of Transfer Pricing, The World Economy, forthcoming 
 
Baker, Raymond (2005), Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-
Market System, John Wiley & Sons Inc. Hoboken, United States 
 
Boyrie, Marie, Simon Pak and John Zdanowicz (2005), Estimating the Magnitude of Capital Flight 
due to Abnormal Pricing in International Trade: The Russia–USA Case, Accounting Forum 29(3), pp. 
249-270 
 
Buettner, Thiess and Georg Wamser (2007), "Intercompany Loans and Profit Shifting – Evidence 
from Company-Level Data", CESifo Working Paper Nr. 1959 
 
Christian Aid (2008), Death and taxes: The true toll of tax dodging, May 2008. 
 
Christian Aid (2009), False Profits: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax free, A Christian Aid Report, 
March 2009. 
 
Clausing, Kimberly (2003), Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices, Journal of 
Public Economics 87, 2207-2223. 
 
Desai, M., C.F. Foley and J.R. Hines (2004), Foreign Direct Investment in a World of Multiple Taxes, 
Journal of Public Economics 88 (12), pp. 2727-2744. 
 
Desai, Mihir, Fritz Foley and Jim Hines (2006a), Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity? 
Economics Letters 90(2), pp. 219-224.  
 
Desai, Mihir, Fritz Foley and Jim Hines (2006b), The Demand for Tax Haven Operations, Journal of 
Public Economics 90(3), pp. 513-531  
 
Devereux, Michael (2007), The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: A 
Survey of Empirical Evidence, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper 07/02 
 
Dharmapala, Dhammika and Jim Hines (2006), Which Countries Become Tax Havens? NBER 
Working Paper No. 12802. 
 
Dischinger, M. and N. Riedel (2008), Corporate Taxes and the Location of Intangible Assets within 
Multinational Firms, Munich Economics Discussion Papers 2008/15 
 
Egger, P., W. Eggert and H. Winner (2007), Saving Taxes through Foreign Plant Ownership, CESifo 
Working Paper No. 1887 
 
 30 
Erard, Brian and Jonathan S. Feinstein (2001), Estimating the Federal Income Tax Gap Using 
Operational Audit Data, report prepared for the IRS Economic Analysis and Modeling Group 
 
Fuest, Clemens and Nadine Riedel (2009), Tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax expenditures in 
developing countries: a review of the literature, Report for the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID). 
 
GFI (2009), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity, 
Washington 
 
Grubert, H. and J. Mutti (2000), Do Taxes Influence where U.S. Corporations Invest?, National Tax 
Journal 53(4), 825-839. 
 
Grubert, Harry and John Mutti (2004), Empirical Asymmetries in Foreign Direct Investment and 
Taxation, Journal of International Economics 62(2), 337-358. 
 
Helpman, E., M. Melitz, S.R. Yeaple, 2004, Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms, American 
Economic Review 94(1), pp. 300-316. 
 
Hines, James R. and Eric M. Rice (1994), Fiscal Paradise: Tax Havens and American Business, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 149-182.  
 
Hong, Qing and Michael Smart (2006), In praise of tax havens. International tax planning and foreign 
direct investment, forthcoming in European Economic Review.. 
 
Howard, Michael (2001), Public Sector Economics for Developing Countries, University Press of 
West Indies 
 
Huizinga, Harry and Luc Laeven (2008), International profit shifting within multinationals: A multi-
country-perspective, Journal of Public Economics 92, 1164-1182. 
 
Huizinga, Harry, Luc Laeven and Gaetan Nicodeme (2008), Capital Structure and International Debt 
Shifting, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 80-118. 
 
Keen Michael and Mario Mansour (2008), Revenue Mobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF Fiscal 
Affairs Department, 11 August 2008.  
 
Klemm, Alexander (2009), Causes, benefits and Risks of Business Tax Incentives, IMF Working 
Paper 09/21. 
 
KPMG (1998), Corporate Tax Rate Survey 2008. 
 
Lipponer, A. (2009), Microdatabase Direct Investment – MiDi – A Brief Guide, Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
 
Maffini, Giorgia (2009), Tax Payments of Multinational Groups with Operations in Tax Havens, 
mimeo 
 
Mataloni, R.J. (1995), A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies. Survey of Current 
 31 
Business 75, pp. 38-55. 
 
OECD (2001), Corporate Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, OECD Tax Policy Studies No 
4, Paris. 
 
Oxfam (2000), Tax Havens – Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty Eradication, Oxfam GB 
Policy Paper 
 
Oxfam (2009), Tax haven crackdown could deliver 120 bn a year to reduce poverty - Oxfam, March 
13, 2009, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applications/blogs/pressoffice/?p=3912. 
 
Pak, Simon, Stelios Zanakis and John Zdanowicz (2003), Detecting Abnormal Pricing in International 
Trade: The Greece – USA Case, Interfaces 33(2) pp. 54-64 
 
Pak, Simon (2007), Closing the Floodgates – Collecting Tax to Pay for Development, Commissioned 
by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Tax Justice Network. 
 
Quijano, A. M. (1990), A Guide to BEA Statistics on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 
Survey of Current Business, pp. 29-37 
 
Schott, Peter K. (2008) The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports, Economic Policy 53, 5-49. 
 
Shome, Paarthasarathi and Vito Tanzi (1993), A Primer on Tax Evasion, IMF Staff Papers 40, 807-
828. 
 
Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki (2002), Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration, Handbook 
of Public Economics, in: A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics, Edition 1, 
Volume 3, Chapter 22, pp. 1423-1470 
 
Smarzynska, Beata and Shang-Jin Wei (2000), “Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Firm-level Evidence.” NBER Working Papers: 7969. 
 
TJN (2005), The Price of Offshore, Tax Justice Network Briefing Paper. 
 
TJN (2007), Closing the Floodgates, Collecting Taxes to Pay for Development, Study Commissioned 
by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
TJN (2009), Magnitudes: Dirty Money, Lost Taxes and Offshore, 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=103 
 
UNCTAD (1999), World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of 
Development, United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, New York and Geneva 
 
Wei, Shang-Jin (2000), “How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 82(1), pp. 1-11. 
 
Weichenrieder, Alfons (2009), Profit Shifting in the EU: Evidence from germany, International Tax 
and Public Finance 19, 281-297. 
 
 32 
Weyzig, Francis and Michiel van Dijk (2008), Tax Haven and Development Partner: Incoherence in 
Dutch Government Policies, MPRA Paper No. 12526 
 
Zdanowicz, John, Simon Pak and Michael Sullivan (1999), Brazil-United States Trade: Capital Flight 
through Abnormal Pricing, International Trade Journal XIII(4). 
 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Table A1. ORBIS and other firm-level datasets produced by Bureau van Dijk 
Coverage Population of 57 million public and private companies around the world.22
 
 
Frequency: annual 
 
Type of data and 
observation unit 
Accounting and financial data, consolidated and unconsolidated on the firm level. 
 
 
Variables Profit and income variables: 
Information from the profit and loss account, e.g. 
• Sales 
• Pre-tax profit (operating profit (EBIT) / financial and operation profit)  
• After-tax profit 
Tax variables: 
• Taxes charged to the P&L account 
Ownership variables: 
• Country, name and identifier of all direct and indirect shareholders  
• Country, name and identifier of all direct and indirect subsidiaries  
• Direct/total percentages of ownership  
• Type of shareholders23
• Independence indicator  
 
 
Other relevant variables: 
• Current and non-current debt  
• Interest expenses  
• Intangible assets  
 
Sources of data and 
collection methods 
Data are derived from the official balance sheet, P&L account, and financial statements 
notes and are complemented with news, market research, information from official bodies 
(for example, stock exchanges) and private correspondence. The producer of the data has 
developed a uniform format which is applied to each entity analysed in order to address 
comparison issues.   
 
Drawbacks of the data There might be differences in accounting standards which could make the comparison 
difficult. The coverage in many developing countries is small.   
 
Availability The data set is compiled by the Bureau van Dijk and can be accessed online with an annual 
subscription or bought as a DVD. 
 
Information on the 
dataset 
www.bvdep.com 
 
                                                 
22 There are three different modules available. The very large companies module contains data for all listed companies, regardless of their size and for 
companies satisfying at least one of the following criteria:  operating revenues larger than 130 million US$, total assets larger than 260 million US$, or 
number of employees larger than 1000. In the large companies module, companies are included if they satisfy at least one of the following criteria:  
operating revenues larger than 13 million US$, total assets larger than 26 million US$, or number of employees larger than 150. In the medium companies 
module, companies are included if their operating revenues are larger than 1.3 million US$, their total assets are larger than 2.6 million US$, or their 
number of employees is larger then 15. Small companies include the entities not fulfilling the aforementioned criteria.  
23 Shareholder types are divided in 11 categories: banks and financial companies, insurance companies, industrial companies, public 
authorities/State/Government, one or more individuals or families, foundations (inc. research institutes), mutual and pension 
funds/nominees/trusts/trustees, employees/managers/directors, unnamed individuals and families, bulk lists of companies and private owners, public 
(used only for publicly listed companies).  
 
 34 
 
Table A2. COMPUSTAT Database 
Coverage Compustat Global: non-US and non-Canadian publicly traded companies in 
more than 80 countries, representing 90 per cent of the world’s market 
capitalisation. 
 
Frequency: annual and quarterly 
 
Type of data Financial and accounting data, consolidated and unconsolidated. 
 
Variables Profit and income variables 
Information from the profit and loss account, e.g. 
• Pre-tax earnings 
• After-tax earnings 
• Sales from foreign operations to unaffiliated foreign customers 
Tax variables 
• Total tax expenses 
• Cash taxes paid 
• Foreign taxes paid  
Other relevant variables 
• R&D expenditures  
• Current debt and long-term debt (total, issuance, reduction) 
• Interest expenses 
• Exports to unaffiliated foreign customers 
 
Sources of data and 
collection methods 
The producer of the dataset employ original company sources by extracting 
financial information, removing reporting biases and reconciling data 
discrepancies. It standardise data by financial statement and by specific data 
item definition, preparing information that is broadly comparable across 
companies, industries, time periods and sectors.   
 
Drawbacks of the data Not possible to link parent data with subsidiaries. Only listed companies? The 
coverage in many developing countries is small. Good coverage of Asian 
countries.  
 
Availability  Created and sold by Standard and Poor’s. 
 
Information on the dataset www.compustat.com 
 
Note Standard and Poor’s also sells the Compustat Global Financial Service file 
which contains information on the Income Statement, the balance sheet and the 
flow of funds for financial companies.    
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Table A3. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Operations of Multinational Companies Database 
Coverage The Outward Investment database contains data for all foreign business enterprises 
owned 10 per cent or more, directly or indirectly, by a US person or corporation.  
 
Frequency: every five years and annual.   
 
Type of data and observation 
unit 
Unconsolidated accounting and financial data on the firm level.24
 
 
 
Variables Profit and income variables 
• US parent’s domestic sales  
• Affiliates’ domestic sales  
• Affiliates’ arms-length sales to United States25
• Foreign sales
 
 
26
• Value added 
 
Tax variables 
• Direct and indirect27
• Foreign income taxes paid  
 taxes paid   
• Foreign indirect taxes 
Ownership variables 
• Link between affiliate and parent 
Other relevant variables 
• Intermediate inputs shipped intra-firm (in both directions)   
• R&D expenditures  
• Capital expenditures  
• Dividends/net income to owners  
• Information of company financing 
 
Sources of data and collection 
methods 
Data are taken from the mandatory Benchmark and Annual Surveys of US Direct 
Investment Abroad.  In non-benchmark survey years, a sample survey is conducted 
excluding small affiliates in order to reduce reporting burden on them. The BEA 
estimates the data for these affiliates by extrapolating their data from most recent 
Benchmark Survey.   
 
Drawbacks of the dataset For smaller firms, data between two Benchmark Surveys are estimated.  
 
Availability It can be accessed only on site at the Bureau of Economic Analysis through the 
“BEA Program for Outside Researchers”.   
 
Information on the dataset www.bea.org  
Mataloni, 1995 and Quijano, 1990 
                                                 
24 Information on foreign subsidiaries is collected according to US accounting principles. This implies that variables are comparable across 
subsidiaries located in different countries (Desai et al., 2006).  
25 The BEA data do not contain US parents’ arms-length sales to the country where the affiliate is located.   
26 These are sales to unaffiliated foreign customers from foreign operations.  
27 The indirect tax burden is reported as a sum of sales taxes, value added taxes, and excise taxes paid. For more information, see Desai et al. (2004).  
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Table A4. Deutsche Bundesbank Microdatabase on Direct Investment (MiDi) 
Coverage Foreign-owned firms based in Germany and directly and indirectly owned foreign 
affiliates of German parent companies.  
 
Time period: Panel data are available from 1996. From 1989 to 2001, only semi-
aggregated data by country and (or) by sector are available.  
 
Frequency: annual 
 
Type of data and 
observation unit 
Unconsolidated (and sometimes consolidated) balance sheet data on the firm level 
 
 
Variables Profit and income variables 
• Profit and loss after tax and before dividend distributions 
Ownership variables 
• Link between affiliate and parent 
Other relevant variables   
• Liabilities to shareholders and (or) affiliates 
• Total balance sheet of affiliates and parent 
• Shares in the assets and liability positions of the non-residents  
 
Sources of data and 
collection methods 
According to the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation 
(Außenwirtschaftsverordnung) and the Law on Foreign Trade and Payments 
(Außenwirtschaftsgesetz), foreign-owned firms based in Germany have to submit 
answers to an annual stock survey organized by the Deutsche Bundesbank if the 
enterprise has a balance sheet total of more than €3 million in which a non-resident (or 
several economically linked non-residents) holds 10 per cent or more of the shares or 
voting rights, directly or indirectly. Reports are also required if foreign-owned branches 
or permanent establishments located Germany have operating assets in excess of €3 
million.  
 
German-owned enterprises have to report their foreign direct investments if either the 
capital shares or voting rights in the foreign affiliate exceed directly or indirectly some 
threshold (10 per cent starting in 2002) and (or) the balance sheet total of the foreign 
affiliate is above a thresholds (3 million EUR starting in 2002).  
 
Drawbacks of the data Data for the foreign parent are scarce: information is restricted to the economic sector 
and the country in which the firm is active. There are neither income statement items, 
except for after tax balance sheet profits, or tax data. Threshold for mandatory reporting 
of data varies over time and therefore the number of firms available every year varies 
before 2002. 
 
Availability  Data are confidential and available only on site at the Research Centre of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank Central Office in Frankfurt. 
 
Information on the data Lipponer (2008) 
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Table A5. UK Office of National Statistics Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) 
Coverage Foreign affiliates of UK entities (Outward Inquiry). It covers all UK firms engaging in 
FDI and their directly held foreign affiliates if the investor holds at least 10 per cent of 
the capital of the recipients.  
 
Frequency: annual 
 
Type of data and 
observation unit 
Information on financial flows on the firm level 
 
 
Variables Profit and income variables 
• Subsidiary or branch net profit and loss  
• Subsidiary or branch net earnings  
Tax variables 
• Subsidiary tax credits 
• Subsidiary tax refunds 
Ownership variables 
• Link between UK parent and foreign affiliate or branch 
• Parent identificator which (partly) allows to identify group linkages 
• Percentage owned 
Other relevant variables 
• Interest (net, received, paid)   
• Branch/head office debt from and to the United Kingdom 
• Subsidiary interest payment 
• Subsidiary dividends payment 
 
Sources of data and 
collection methods 
Data are collected through survey forms sent to the head of enterprise groups in the 
United Kingdom. Firms are sampled from different registers, including HM Customs & 
Revenue, Dunn & Bradstreet’s “Worldbase” system, and ONS inquiries on Acquisitions 
& Mergers. The largest firms all receive the survey forms every year, while only a 
proportion of the smaller firms do. 
 
Drawbacks of the data Information on FDI is not always entered promptly, depending on when the Office of 
National Statistics learns about the investment from various sources. There are no 
income statement items, except for after tax balance sheet profits. Only information on 
directly held affiliates. Only information on “flow” variables, no information on “stock” 
variables (e.g. investment size). 
 
Availability  Data are confidential and available only on site at the Office of National Statistics in 
London or Newport. 
 
Information on the data www.ons.gov.uk 
  
 
Note  Through the enterprise group reference, the AFDI can be linked to the Annual 
Respondents Database (ARD) to derive more balance sheet and P&L account 
information on the domestic- and foreign-owned establishments based in the United 
Kingdom. Information in ARD includes turnover, costs of intermediate inputs, number 
of employees, labour costs.  
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Table A6. US Firm-level tax returns 
Coverage All companies filing tax returns in the United States. 
 
Frequency: annual 
 
Type of data and observation unit Tax return data on the firm level 
 
Variables Profit and income variables: 
• Income of US parent  
• Income of controlled foreign company (CFC)  
Tax variables: 
• Income taxes paid at the US parent  
• Foreign taxes paid at the subsidiary  
Other relevant variables: 
• Inter-company transactions  
• R&D expenditures of the parent  
 
Sources of data and collection 
methods 
Data are taken directly from US tax returns Forms 1120, 1118 and 5471. The 
former is the basic parent corporate income tax return. The second is the form 
used to claim a foreign tax, and the latter contains the CFC’s income, foreign 
taxes paid, and transactions with related parties, including the parent company.  
 
Availability Data are confidential and not available to the general public. 
 
Information on the dataset Grubert and Mutti, 2000 
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Table A7. Other firm-level datasets available 
Country   Name of Dataset Coverage 
France  Liaison financières (LIFI), annual mandatory survey 
developed by the Institute National de la Statistique et des 
Etudes Economiques (INSEE).  
Private enterprises with 
20 or more employees.  
Italy   Reprint Database developed at the Department of 
Economics and Production of the Politecnico di Milano 
with the support of the ICE (National Institute for Foreign 
Trade) and CNEL (the Italian National Council for 
Economy and Labour).  
Mining and 
manufacturing firms 
based in Italy and 
controlled by foreign 
companies or foreign 
entities controlled by 
Italian companies.  
Japan   Annual Survey on Trends in Business Activities of Foreign 
Affiliates in Japan & on Japanese Investors and their 
Foreign Affiliates carried out by the Enterprise Statistics 
Division, Research and Statistics Department and the 
International Business Affairs Division, Industrial Policy 
Bureau, MITI.  
Majority foreign-owned 
firms based in Japan 
(excluding financial, 
insurance and real 
estate sector) and 
Japanese investors 
abroad.  
Sweden  Surveys on Swedish owned enterprises abroad conduced 
by NUTEK.  
All Swedish groups 
having subsidiaries 
abroad with more than 
one employee.  
  Repeated survey (every 4/5 years) prepared by the 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI).  
Manufacturing Swedish 
companies with 50 or 
more employees.  
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